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 1 Summary
The aim of this thesis was to find experimentally the minimal activity of Co-60 and Cs-137 isotopes
carried by a  person walking at  a speed of about 5 km/hour that can be detected by spectroscopic
gamma-ray detectors placed in the geometry of a pedestrian portal with less than 1 false alarm in 24
hours. On order to achieve it, following steps were made:
1.  The ability of MCNP code to calculate responses of scintillator-based detectors was tested.  The
results were confirmed by direct measurements. 
2. Experimental setup with BGO-based gamma-detector and Co-60 and Cs-137 gamma-sources was
constructed. 
3. Feasibility of using spectroscopic scintillator detectors as part of security portals operating in real
time has been confirmed. 
4.  The minimal  detectable  activities  of  Co-60 and Cs-137 in  the  case  of  using  one detector  were
experimentally determined. 
The results show that minimal detection ability of only 1 BGO detector is enough to detect minimal
activity of Co-60 that is not dangerous to environment determined by IAEA norms, and is not enough
to detect minimal activity of Cs-137.
CERCS codes: P220 Nuclear physics, T160 Nuclear engineering and technology.
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 2 Kokkuvõte
Käesoleva töö eesmärgiks oli katseliselt, kiirusega 5km/tunnis kõndiva inimese kantud Co-60 ja Cs-
137  gamma-allikate  minimaalsete  aktiivsuse  väärtuste  leidmine,  mis  on  avastatavad  jalakäijate
turvavärava geomeetriale vastavalt asetatud spektroskoopilise gammadetektorite abil nii, et 1 valehäire
esineks rohkem kui 24 tunni jooksul. Selle saavutamiseks teostati järgnev:
1.  Katsetati  programmi  MCNP  sobivust  stsintillatsioon-  detektorite  koste  väljaarvutamiseks.
Arvutustulemused said kinnitust otsemõõtmistel.
2. Koostati eksperimentaalne skeem, mis koosnes BGO-l põhinevast gamma-detektorist ning Co-60 ja
Cs-137 gamma-allikatest.
3.  Tõestati  spektroskoopiliste  stsinillatsioon-detektorite  sobivus  kasutamiseks  reaalajas  töötavates
turvaväravates.
4. Määrati  eksperimentaalselt Co-60 ja Cs-137 allikate aktiivsuste minimaalsed avastamisväärtused 
ühe detektori kasutamisel.
Tulemused näitavad, et juba ühe BGO detektori avastamisevõimest piisab Co-60 allika, mille gamma-
aktiivsus  ei  ületa  IAEA poolt  määratud  ohutuspiiri,  avastamiseks,  kuid  jääb  siiski  väheseks  IAEA
ohutusnormidele vastava aktiivsusega Cs-137 allika avastamiseks.
CERCS koodid: P220 Nuclear physics, T160 Nuclear engineering and technology.
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 3 Introduction
Unlike 70-80 years ago, when scientists were developing first nuclear weapons, nowadays society is
well informed of the harm that ionizing radiation may cause. Due to intensive technical development
and unstable  situation  in  some regions  of  the  world,  it  is  clearly understandable that  the  topic of
radiation  protection  is  going  to  be  on  top  of  the  society's  agenda.  In  order  to  prevent  illegal
dissemination of radioactive materials more efficiently, new detecting systems are being developed.
While small hand-held radiation detectors are often used to check on a particular threat, stationary
radiation portals are much more efficient in places with a lot of human and transport traffic (such as
seaports, railway stations, airports, customs and border crossings, etc.). These radiation portals may
have different sizes and design, all of them contain the following main components: 
1. An energy-sensitive radiation detector. 
2. An amplifier that amplifies the signal to levels suitable for modern electronics.
3. Electronics to process signals produced by the detector  to form an energy spectrum (e.g.  a
multichannel analyzer). 
4. Data readout device that transfers the digitized information to computer or screen. 
Development  of  reliable  electronics  and  powerful  data  analysis  algorithms  made  possible  fully
automated  standalone  radiation  portals  that  are  widely  used  at  border  and  Customs  checkpoints
worldwide. One important requirement for pedestrian radiation portals is that they have very low false
alarm rate, so that for example they do not react on “legitimate” medical isotopes that people may carry
in their bodies. This is usually achieved nowadays by introducing spectroscopic channel that can select
only isotopes of interest while suppressing any variations in the background [1]. 
The  next  logical  step  will  be  integration  of  pedestrian  radiation  portals  into  a  broader  security
infrastructure  together  with  a  new  generation  of  automatic  threat  detection  technologies,  such  as
security radars [2]. 
The main goal of this bachelor thesis was to find experimentally the minimal activity of Co-60 and 
Cs-137 isotopes carried by a person walking at a speed of about 5 km/hour that can be detected by
spectroscopic gamma-ray detectors placed in the geometry of a pedestrian portal with less than 1 false
alarm in 24 hours.
This work was supported by APSTEC Systems, which has a test laboratory in Tartu. APSTEC took part
in formulating the goals of the work and also provided operational gamma-rays detectors based on
BGO (Bismuth germanium oxide) crystal together with data collection software. It also provided a two
4
weeks-long training course in operating the detector,  analyzing the obtained spectra,  and modeling
gamma-spectra with MCNP code. 
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 4 Theoretical aspects of detection of gamma-rays
 4.1 Interaction of photons with matter
The  main  physical  mechanisms  of  gamma-rays  interaction  with  matter  that  are  important  for
understanding  the  obtained  spectral  shapes  are  Compton  scattering,  photoelectric  effect  and  pair-
production process. 
In the Compton effect, the photon is scattered from an electron that is essentially not bound to an atom.
Because the scattering angle can vary from 0 to 180 degrees, there is a range of energies that can be
transferred from the photon to the recoiling electron:
λ' – λ = λk [1 – cos(θ)] (1)
where λ is initial wavelength, λ' is wavelength after scattering, θ is scattering angle and λk is Compton
wavelength. The scattered photon survives and carries off the remainder of energy. It is the recoiling
electron that loses energy by ionizing the detector material. Consequently, the charge collected from the
detector will yield a distribution of pulse amplitudes at the preamplifier output up to some maximum
pulse height. There is a statistical probability that each Compton scattering event has an approximately
equal chance to produce a pulse with any height up to this maximum. Thus, Compton events will
provide a broad low-energy continuum in the spectrum ([3], pp. 87-94).
In  the  photoelectric  effect,  the  photon  transfers  all  its  energy  to  an  electron  in  the  detector  and
disappears. The electron loses energy by causing further ionization of the detector material. Depending
of  the  detector  type  (semiconductor,  scintillation)  this  ionization  is  converted  into  a  signal  by an
appropriate mechanism ([3], pp. 83-87)
During the pair-production process,  the gamma-ray photon enters the detector,  creates an electron-
positron pair and disappears. All the energy of the initial photon is transferred to the electron-positron
pair:
E0+ p= hν− 2m0c
2
(2)
Both the positron and the electron lose energy by causing ionization of the atoms in the detector.
Because the positron is moving slowly enough, it can be captured by a free electron, and the two can
combine. In this annihilation of the positron with an electron, both particles disappear, and their rest
masses (511 eV each) are converted into two photons traveling in opposite directions. Since both these
photons can lose all their energy in the volume of the detector, or one of both of them can escape, three
peaks are appear in the measured spectrum: the main one (full energy peak - both photons interact with
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crystal), single escape peak (only one interacts with the matter, another escapes) and double escape
(both photons escape without interaction). ([3], pp. 95-97) 
 4.2 Detecting gamma-rays by scintillator-based detectors
The  key element  of  any gamma-detector  is  energy-sensitive  radiation  detector  (ESRD).  The most
important qualities of ESRD are [4]:
1. Percent efficiency (also known as “efficiency”) – the percentage of events (decays) detected relative
to all the source’s decays in the same time interval. It mostly depends on size and density of ESRD; and
the distance (and obstacles) between ESRD and gamma source.
2. Peak-to-total ratio (or “peak-to-Compton ratio”) is determined by summation of the counts for all
channels under the photo peak and dividing by all counts observed in the entire spectrum. The ratio
generally decreases with increasing energy of the gamma ray. Good peak-to-total ratio allows one to
easily separate the photo peak from the background and Compton scattering. 
3. Resolution – the ability of detector to resolve two peaks close in energy to each other. Wider peaks
mean more error. Resolution is defined by measuring the width of the peak halfway to the top (Full
Width at Half Maximum or FWHM) and dividing by the energy of the photo peak (E0): 
%Resolution = FWHM
E0
×100% (3)
Currently, due to low cost and good efficiency, the most widespread gamma detector among radiation
portals is polyvinyl-toluene (PVT) plastic scintillator. However, it has very poor energy resolution, so it
cannot identify the radioactive isotope and is  thus not used in spectroscopic gamma-ray detectors,
which must be able to distinguish between naturally occurring isotopes, medical isotopes etc. 
On the other end of the price scale are semiconductor high purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors, which
have  excellent  energy resolution,  but  poor  efficiency at  higher  energies.  HPGe are  rarely used  in
pedestrian portals due to their very high cost and the need of cooling, and because one has to wait for a
long time to collect even a few events before the detector's excellent energy resolution can be used. 
Typically,  spectroscopic  portals  use  NaI  type  scintillating  crystals,  which  have  medium  energy
resolution and medium efficiency. In this work another type of scintillator crystals was used: Bismuth
germanium oxide (BGO), which has slightly worse energy resolution than NaI of the same size, but a
much better peak-to-Compton ratio([3], [5], [6]).
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 4.3 Modeling gamma-spectra using MCNP code
MCNP1 is a Monte-Carlo code created in Los-Alamos National Laboratory in 1960s with the primary
goal  of  calculating  criticality  parameters  of  fission  assemblies.  Later  it  became a general  purpose
neutron and gamma transport code that is widely used to calculate detector responses and estimate
shielding efficiency. 
MCNP calculations are based on extensive data libraries that are supplied together with the code. 
An  MCNP problem  is  set  up  by  writing  a  text  file  containing  instructions  describing  geometry,
materials, radiation sources and detectors. In this Thesis we used the gamma-ray detection subset of
MCNP, which allows one to simulate the pulse shape spectra of arbitrary gamma-sources. 
Below is an example of a text file containing instructions to calculate the response of a BGO-based
scintillator detector to Cs-137 source. 
c -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
c ********** Response function calculation 
c ********** (C) Andrej Kovalyov, APSTEC Systems, 2015
c -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
c ********** CELLS
1 0  (-1:2:-3:4:-5:6)                     imp:p=0 $ outside of the room
2 1 -0.00123 1 -2 3 -4 5 -6 #3            imp:p=1 $ air in the room
3 2 -7.13 -10 11 -12 trcl=1               imp:p=1 $ BGO crystal
c -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
c ********** SURFACES
c *** Room walls
1 PX -100            $ YZ plane
2 PX  100            $ YZ plane
3 PY -100            $ XZ plane
4 PY  100            $ XZ plane
5 PZ -100            $ XY plane
6 PZ  100            $ XY plane
c
c *** 3inch X 3inch cylinder (BGO crystal)
10 CY   3.81         $ cylinder
11 PY   0            $ XZ plane
12 PY   7.62         $ XZ plane
c -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
c ********** COORDINATE TRANSFORMATIONS
TR1 0.0 50.0 0.0                                 $ shiftX, shiftY, shiftZ
c
c -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/18/044/18044302.pdf
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c ********** MATERIALS
m1 7014   0.800   8016  0.200              gas=1        $ Air in room
m2 83209  0.211  32000  0.158 8016   0.631              $ BGO crystal
m3 14000 -0.200   8016 -0.495 20000 -0.286 1001 -0.019  $ Concrete
m4 6000   0.333   1001  0.667                           $ Polyethilene
c
m5    1001 1                                            $ H
m6    6000 1                                            $ C
m7    7014 1                                            $ N
m8    8016 1                                            $ O
m9    9019 1                                            $ F
m11  11023 1                                            $ Na
m12  12000 1                                            $ Mg
m13  13027 1                                            $ Al
m14  14000 1                                            $ Si
m15  15031 1                                            $ P
m16  16000 1                                            $ S
m17  17000 1                                            $ Cl
m19  19000 1                                            $ K
m20  20000 1                                            $ Ca
m21  21000 1                                            $ Sc
m22  22000 1                                            $ Ti
m23  23000 1                                            $ V
m24  24000 1                                            $ Cr
m25  25000 1                                            $ Mn
m26  26000 1                                            $ Fe
m27  27000 1                                            $ Co
m28  28000 1                                            $ Ni
m29  29000 1                                            $ Cu
m30  30000 1                                            $ Zn
m32  32000 1                                            $ Ge 
m33  33075 1                                            $ As
c
c -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
c ********** GAMMA SOURCE
c http://ie.lbl.gov/toi/nucSearch.asp
c
SDEF ERG=D1 POS 0 0.01 0 par=2         $ Gamma source location
c
c *** Line energies in MeV
SI1 L 0.28353 0.661657
c *** Relative line intensities
SP1 0.00058 85.1
c
c -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
c ********** GENERAL SETTINGS
MODE P                         $ Account for photons
NPS 1000000000                 $ Number of photons to emit
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c
c -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
c ********** OUTPUT OPTIONS
print
prdmp j j j 1 j
c
c -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
c ********** TALLIES
f8:p 3                       $ pulse high distribution in cell 3
ft8 GEB 0.0 0.075 0.0        $ BGO energy resolution: FWHM = a+b*sqrt(E+c*E^2)
e8  0 3999I 4.0              $ energy range and energy bins
c
Meaning of different sections are explained in the comments in the text. 
 Figure 1 shows results of calculations of responses of the BGO detector to a number of important
gamma-emitting isotopes that are widely used in industry. 
Figure 1. Calculated responses of the 3x3 inch BGO detector to some gamma-emitting isotopes
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Figure 2. Comparison of the measured (red line) and calculated (blue line)
spectra of Co-60 for 33 inch BGO gamma-ray detector.
 Figure 2 shows comparison of the measured and calculated spectra of Co-60 for 33 inch BGO 
gamma-ray detector. Thus, MCNP allows one to calculate the response of the given type of gamma-
detector to any isotope in realistic assumptions about the detection geometry and the surrounding 
materials.
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 5 Experimental work
 5.1 Description of the equipment
In this work the following equipment was used:
1. APSTEC's gamma detector with cylindrical 33 inch bismuth germanium oxide (Bi4Ge3O12
or  BGO)  crystal  as  energy-sensitive  radiation  detector,  HAMAMATSU  R6233-01  photo
multiplier  with voltage divider,  and custom made digital  electronics with fast  amplitude-to-
digital converter. 
2. USB cable for power supply of the detector and data transmission.
3. Personal computer for data storing and processing.
4. 2  wooden  rectangular  rulers  for  determination  of  fact  that  the  whole  detector  is  strictly
perpendicular to the path of source and for determination of distance between them.
5. 2 paper rulers (1 m long) for measurement source’s positions on their path.
6. 2 tables, where the whole experiment was made.
 5.2 Description of gamma-sources
Due to pretty high threshold energy of the BGO detector, it can not effectively detect gamma rays with
energy less than 200 keV, which decreases the variety of detectable radioactive isotopes. However,
there are still around 23 high abundance isotopes that BGO detector is able to identify (see Appendix
A). Two of them were available in university of Tartu for experiments: 
1. Cs-137 with current activity 8.81(7) kBq. 
2. Co-60 with current activity 27.83 (27) kBq.
 5.3 Experimental setup
In real life, pedestrian radiation portals usually are made in a form of letter “П”: ~2 m wide and ~3 m
high. Of course, there are different configurations, depending on amount of detectors and their’ sizes,
but in one of the most simple and widespread configuration there are 2 detectors that are placed in a
distance ~2 m from each other at ~1 m from the floor. It means that the maximal distance from any
12
detector to the path of gamma radiation source that may pass through the portal is equal or less than
1 meter. Thus, if we wish to make a simulation of real life situation with only 1 detector, then the
distance between source path and detector should be the same.
In order to simulate the passing of human with source of gamma radiation, for following experiment
setup was made. The detector was placed vertically on a table (height of the table was ~75-78 cm),
distance from the detector to the nearest wall ~50 cm, to the other walls — more than 3 m. 
Natural background radiation coming from a 70 kg person is typically ~7.4 kBq (4400 Bq of K-40 and
3000  Bq of  C-14),  the  average  activity  from K-40 in  Earth’s  crust  is  850 Bq/kg,  and  maximum
prohibited activity of any material (by International Atomic Energy Agency) is between 100 Bq/kg
(pure Ac-227) and 10 GBq/kg (pure Ar-39) depending on mix of radioactive elements ([7], [8]).
For pure Co-60 maximal permitted total activity for ordinary materials is 100 kBq and for Cs-137 this 
value is 10 kBq [8]. 
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Figure 3. Schematic view of the measurement geometry. 
 Figure 3 shows the schematic geometry of the experiment. There are 2 important axes: vertical (Y) and
horizontal (X). Due to low activity of available gamma sources (~8 and ~29 kBq), the distance from
detector to the path (axis Y at point 0) of source was decreased 5 times: from 1 m to 20 cm. The
relation between radiation intensity and distance is I ~ 1/R2,  which allows us to simulate 25 times
stronger activity on the path with distance 1 m from the detector. 
Also,  in  order  to  keep  the  geometry  the  same,  horizontal  axis  X  is  also  decreased  5  times.
Measurements with Cs-137 and Co-60 sources were done at  15 points,  with Y = 20 cm (distance
between detector and path of source) and dX = 15 cm (distance between points for measurements). 10
measurements were done at each point; duration of each measurement was 1 second.
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In total, for each source 3 various series of experiments were done (2 elements*3 series*15 points*10
measurements = 900 measurements in total): 
1. Pure source. In this case, there is only source and detector with no obstacles between them.
2. Source and bottle. Source is attached to 5 liter plastic bottle filled with water, which simulates a
body of human that tries to pass the detector with gamma source in the “back” pocket. It means
that the source always have the correct position (exactly in the point of measurements), and is
attached to the “back” of the bottle (“human”): in negative positions gamma rays has to pass
through the bottle to reach the detector, but in positive positions there are no obstacles between
them.
3. Source with lead shielding. In this case, there is 0.5 mm thick lead shield between the source
and the detector (at distance ~3 cm from the source).
Photographs of the experiment are available at Appendix B.
 5.4 Data analysis procedure
The ultimate goal of the data analysis was to detect a radioactive source while the person is walking
through the portal. The detection is based on the analysis of the signal to noise ratio (SNR), where the
signal is the total number of detected gamma-rays from the radioactive source, and the background is
the total number of detected gamma-rays coming from natural background. So, in our case the SNR can
be referred to as signal-to-background ratio. 
Radioactive decay is a random process. It is not possible to say when an unstable nucleus will decay,
only that  it  will  decay with  certain  probability  within  certain  period  of  time.  Natural  background
follows Poisson distribution: 
P (k )=λ
k e−λ
k !
(4)
where P(k) is the probability that k events will happen within some time interval (e.g. one second), and
λ is the mean number of events per this time interval. 
For  sufficiently  large  values  of  λ  the  normal  distribution  with  mean  λ  and  variance  λ  (standard
deviation λ1/2) becomes a good approximation to the Poisson distribution. 
The probability that we will get a particular count rate can be approximated by a Gaussian (or normal)
distribution: ([4], pp. 41-46)
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f ( x)= 1
σ√ 2 π
×e
−(x−μ)2
2 σ2  (5), 
where μ is mean of the distribution and σ is standard deviation.
In a Poisson process, the number of observed occurrences fluctuates about its mean λ with a standard
deviation
σ k=√λ   (6). 
Thus, in radioactivity detection portal the criterion for the detection is usually taken to be:
Neffect > n * sqrt(Nbackground) (7), 
where n is a parameter corresponding to the required SNR, and Neffect and Nbackground are the number of
gamma-rays detected form the radioactive source and the natural background respectively. 
The parameter n is directly connected to the expected number of false alarms that the system would
produce due to accidental excess in the number of detected gamma-rays. The integral of the normal
distribution from n to infinity (quantile) equals the probability that the detected number of gamma-rays
will  exceed  the  mean  by  n  standard  deviations.  Picture  below illustrates  the  shape  of  normal
distribution (μ = 0, σ = 1). Green lines show us various sigma levels: for example, the area under the
peak in segment [1, ] is equal to 0.159, which translates into about 16% probability that the SNR in
the given measurement will exceed the one-sigma threshold. 
Illustration of a normal distribution. 
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For reasonable number of false alarms produced by a radiation portal is of the order of one per day.
This translates into the requirement that SNR ≥ 5, so the “five-sigma” rule was chosen as the target in
this work. 
 5.5 Experimental results
Due to low activity and small time of each measurement (1 second, which is dictated by the typical
speed with which the person would pass through the radiation portal), the measured spectra have very
low statistics.  It  means that at  points with maximal distance from the detector (points 105 cm and
-105 cm)  the  contribution  from the  source  is  very  weak,  so  we  can  assume  that  the  detector  is
measuring pure background. Even at closest best positions (points -15 cm and 15 cm) there are not too
many events under the peak integral.  Figure 4 and  Figure 5 illustrate typical measurement results for
pure Co-60 at the farthest and the closest points of the trajectory. 
So, in all further calculations, measurements at point -150 cm and 150 cm were assumed to be pure
background. There was 2 different methods to find the final result (both use same formulas): “mean”
method and “finer” method. The first one was used to receive general picture and second one was used
to receive precise results with lower uncertainty.
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Figure 5. Example of a spectrum of Co-60
measured in 1 second at the closest point of the
trajectory. 
Figure 4. Example of a spectrum of Co-60 measured
in 1 second at the farthest point of the trajectory. 
 5.5.1 Results provided by “mean” method
The main idea of this method was to find mean value for every single measurement,  its statistical
uncertainty  (so  called  A-type  uncertainty,  because  B-type  uncertainty  is  unknown)  and  degree  of
freedom for further calculations.
First of all, it was necessary to find necessary channels for peak detection. For that propose, all 10
measurement results of “pure source” series at point 0 was summed. Co-60 has strong gamma lines at
~1173 keV and ~1333 keV, while Cs-137 has strong line at 662 keV. Knowing that 1 channel number
~ 1 keV (but NOT EQUAL!) and comparing it with background spectra, it is possible to find necessary
intervals.   Figure 6 and   Figure 7 show the result (red color shows spectrum of the corresponding
isotope, blue color shows the background).
Simple analysis of received spectra allows to locate necessary channels (necessary area under the peak
was at FWHM (full width at half maximum)): [1093-1175] and [1246-1347] for Co-60 and [616-664]
for Cs-137.
In order to find mean value of background, we sum all events (x) in necessary channels [a; b] for all
background measurements and then divide it on number of measurements in this point (N). Due to
absence of information about B-type uncertainty, we may use only experimental standard deviation of
the mean (A-type uncertainty) to form total uncertainty. Also, we may say that degree of freedom ν is
equal to N – 1.
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Figure 7. Comparison of the spectrum of Cs-137
with the background. 
Figure 6. Comparison of the spectrum of Co-60
with the background. 
B=
∑
j=1
N
∑
i=a
b
x i , j
N     u A(B)=√∑j=1N (∑i=ab xi−B) j
2
N (N−1)
 (8), (9)
Same formulas may be be applied to find average value of signal at any point, its uncertainty and
degree of freedom. The only difference is in number of measurements – for background we have 2
points (-105 and 105) with N = 10 + 10 = 20; and for the rest positions calculations are done for each
point separately (N = 10). Of course, in formula for A-type uncertainty we should use average value of
signal at this point instead of B.
The next step was to find σ values in each point. From theoretical part we know that sigma is directly
proportional to ratio of pure signal (S
 
– B) to background, so:
σ =S−B
√B
   
uC (σ )=√( d (σ )dS i u A(S ))
2
+(
d (σ )
dB
uA(B))
2
 (10), (11)
ν eff=
uC (σ )
4
(
d (σ )
dS i
uA(S ))
4
ν S +
(
d (σ )
dBi
u A(B))
4
ν B
¿
 (12)
where uC is combined uncertainty of sigma and νeff is effective degree of freedom for σ that are used to
obtain expanded uncertainty (U) that is giving a coverage interval for sigma with specified probability: 
U (sigma)=t⋅uC(sigma)  (13)
So in our case, t is coverage factor of Student's t test, that depends on effective degree of freedom and 
specified probability (in our case p = 95%). In all calculations the received value of νeff = 1, which 
means that if p=95, t = 12.71. [9]
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Figure 8. Dependence of the number of "sigmas" on the Co-60 source position along the
trajectory. 
 Figure 8 illustrates results of calculating sigma values for Co-60. As we may see, the smallest value of 
expanded uncertainty (pure Co-60) is extremely high. The only useful information that may be 
obtained from this data is that the maximal sigma valueis located at point 0 (where pure signal is the 
strongest) and that only points [-30; 30] have more or less good signal, all the rest are not suitable, 
because signal there is not very different from background noise. Situation with Cs-137 is even worse. 
Graphs for Cs-137 are available in Appendix C (on those graphs only ordinary uncertainty is available, 
but it is not hard to understand that by multiplying them with t = 12.71 we will receive absurd 
answers). 
 5.5.2 Results provided by “finer” method
“Mean” method provided us with too bad statistics,  so different  approach was applied – so called
“finer” method. From  data analysis procedure chapter we know that radioactive decay is a random
event, and hence that all measurements in all positions are completely independent. It means that in
order to find sigma value in a certain position, we may try to combine all measurements in that point
with all background measurements. The following formula defines mean value of σ for position n with
new method (j = 1 … 10; k = 1 … 20; xn = events of 1 measurement at position n; y - events of 1
background: measurement):
σ n=
∑
m=1
j∗k (∑i=a
b
x i , j
n −∑
i=a
b
yi , k
√∑i=a
b
y i , k )
m
j∗k  (14)
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In other words, we may say that in order to find good mean σ value, we have to:
1. Find sum of events (x) at necessary channels [a; b] for the first measurement at this position (n) 
and to subtract from this number sum of background events (y) at necessary channels [a; b] 
from the first background measurement. Then we have to divide received number by square 
root of sum of background events (y) at necessary channels [a; b] from the same first 
background measurement. This will provide us with first σ value.
2. Repeat step 1 with all the rest measurements (from 2-nd to 10-th) at this position (n) with the 
same first background. This will provide us with first 10 (j = 1 … 10) σ values.
3. Repeat step 1 and 2 with all the rest (from 2-nd to 20-th, because k = 1 … 20) background 
measurements at this position (n). This should provide us with 200 different σ values (10*20 = 
200).
4. Find mean value from received 200 σ values (their sum divided by their number).
Step 3 provided us with 200 different independent σ values, so now it is possible to find experimental
standard deviation of the mean (A-type uncertainty) and degree of freedom for mean σ value at point n:
u A(σ )=√∑m=1
j∗k
(σ m−σ̄ )
2
j⋅k ( j⋅k−1)  , 
ν= j⋅k−1     (15), (16)
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Figure 9. Dependence of the number of "sigmas" on the Co-60 source position
along the trajectory in the "finer" method. 
Figure 10. Dependence of the number of "sigmas" on the Cs-137 source
position along the trajectory. 
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 Figure 9 and  Figure 10 illustrate the results of “finer” method. As we may see, this time expanded
uncertainties are much better and it is possible to continue calculations with those results. 
Also, those graphs illustrate very well one interesting effect - the scattering of gamma photons. The
main idea of this effect is that if we will try to protect the detector with too thin layer of shielding
material then we may receive even stronger signal (in case of human body – bigger dose) than without
shielding. It  happens because photons that originally were not moving into the detector (or human
body) change their direction after scattering and due to the fact, that layer of shielding material is too
thin and cannot  significantly decrease their energies, those photons are hitting the target that they
should not hit without shielding (see  Figure 11). This effect is working not only with objects between
detector  and source,  but also with nearby objects.  In both   Figure 9 and   Figure 10 sigma values
(situation with bottle of water) at positions -30 and are shielded by bottle with water, but when source
is passing points 0, 15 and 30, some of photons that were moving into direction of bottle (not direction
of the detector) change their trajectory and in the end hit the detector. This is the reason why under
certain conditions we have even better σ results than with pure source.
Figure 11. Illustration of shielding effect. Arrows show possible photon trajectory.
However,  received results may not able to provide us with best  answer,  because source should be
moving with speed  5 km/h. It means that we may sum measurements in some positions to receive the
best answer. Knowing that
 5 km/h = 1.389 m/s ≤ 1.5 m/s = 150 cm/s, (17)
it is possible to assume that with this speed source will move though points [-30; 30] for 2 seconds.
Other positions are not so important, because we have to find minimal detection activity of the detector,
and as we may see from previous results, the maximal detection ability is located at position 0 and is
gradually decreasing when source is moving in any direction from this point (backward or forward). In
other words, the detector have to detect something when source is passing through it, but not when
source is still far away. 
Due to the fact,  that motion of the source is  linear and has constant velocity,  there are 3 position
combinations in region [-30; 30] that will allow to find necessary σ value: -30 and 0; -15 and 15; 0 and
15. However, -30 and 0 is more preferable than 0 and 30, because in that case detection will provide
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alarm right after the source passed through the portal, and not when it is 1.5 m away from it (point 30 =
150 cm from the portal, source moves from position -30). Instead of simple summation of 2 sigma
values, it is necessary to use formula _ to find 1 mean value of σ from 2 positions, because during
measurement of gamma spectrum background will also increase (in our case, it will increase 2 times):
σ 1+2=
∑
m=1
j∗k (∑i=a
b
xi , j
1 +∑
i=a
b
xi , j
2 −2⋅∑
i=a
b
y i , k
√2⋅∑i=a
b
yi , k )
m
j∗k  (18)
Here x1 means measured events at first position (-30 or -15, depending on the pair)  and x2 means
measured events at second position (0 or 15). All the rest is the same as in σ calculation for single
position (including uncertainty and degree of freedom calculation). Following table shows results for
new calculations comparing them with old results for point 0:
As we can see, for all situations except Cs-137 and 0.5 mm lead shielding, the best σ value is always 1
second measurement in position 0. It means, that for further calculations we should take this value.
As it was mentioned in experimental setup part, distance between real detector and source at point 0 is
5 times greater than during the experiment. Thus, it is possible to say that received values of sigma are
true for source with activity 25 times greater, than during the experiment. So, we may imagine a graph,
where Y axis shows minimal detection activity (MDA) in kBq and X axis represents necessary sigma
level for detection of activity given by Y axis. In that case, it is possible to add on the graph received
results: for example for Co-60 with activity 695.63 (27) kBq (25*8.81 = 695.63) corresponding σ value
is 46.46. Also, we may say that at point X = 0, Y=0. It means that absolutely any measurement will
cause alarm state, even if there is no gamma source (detector will detect background as a source).
Knowing that dependence of MDA on σ is linear (MDA = a*σ, where “a” is slope), it is easy to make
necessary calculations to find MDA for necessary σ level:
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Comparison of results for different integration times and positions
Source
Pure source Source with bottle Source with lead
Sigma Uncertainty Sigma Uncertainty Sigma Uncertainty
Co-60
1 s (0) 46,46 0,57 51,4 0,85 40,32 0,52
2 s (-30, 0) 45,2 0,5 43,21 0,77 39,2 0,52
2 s (-15,15) 44,39 0,52 45,2 0,79 39,39 0,54
Cs-137
1 s (0) 12,22 0,31 12,77 0,25 11,58 0,43
2 s (-30, 0) 11,24 0,3 10,35 0,26 12,3 0,47
2 s (-15,15) 11,32 0,32 8,6 0,23 11,86 0,47
Integration 
time (pos.)
 Figure 12  and  Figure 13 show dependence of MDA on sigma level in necessary region. Dotted lines
show the worst possible MDA values (maximal activity (activity + uncertainty) with minimal sigma
level (sigma level - uncertainty) and ordinary lines show calculated values of activity and sigma level.
Difference between dotted and ordinary line provide us with uncertainty of MDA.
The following tables shows the necessary MDA for first 8 sigma levels (U means expanded uncertainty
with probability 95%, and with degree of freedom jk – 2, because we are including point 0.0 with
slopes; but it is not very important, because in our case jk ~ (jk – 1) ~ (jk – 2)). In order to have less
than 1 detection per 24 hours, we need σ ≥ 5. 
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Figure 12. Dependence of MDA on sigma level
for C0-60.
Figure 13. Dependence of MDA on sigma level
for Cs-137.
Sigma level
MDA for Cs-137 (kBq)
pure bottle with water 0,5 mm lead shielding
Average U Average U Average U
1 18 2 17 1 19 2
2 36 3 34 2 38 4
3 54 4 52 3 57 6
4 72 5 69 4 76 8
5 90 7 86 5 95 9
6 108 8 103 6 114 11
7 126 9 121 7 133 13
8 144 10 138 8 152 15
The results show that minimal detection ability of only 1 BGO detector is enough to detect minimal
activity of Co-60 that is not dangerous to environment determined by IAEA norms (100 kBq), and is
not enough to detect minimal activity of Cs-137 (10 kBq).
25
Sigma level
MDA for Co-60 (kBq)
pure bottle with water 0,5 mm lead shielding
Average U Average U Average U
1 15 1 14 1 17 1
2 30 2 27 2 35 2
3 45 2 41 3 52 3
4 60 3 54 3 69 4
5 75 4 68 4 86 4
6 90 4 81 5 104 5
7 105 5 95 5 121 6
8 120 6 108 6 138 7
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 8 Appendix A
In the following table are listed only those isotopes that have at least 1 strong line with E=200 keV. The
only exception to this rule are nuclear materials (U and Pu isotopes). Also, critical activity (this level of
activity of special sources and more is dangerous for environment) is given only for medical isotopes, 
whose detection is recommended by IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency).
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Types of radioactive materials:
NORM Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials
MED medical radioactive materials
IND industrial radioactive materials
NUC nuclear radioactive materials
# Categories:
1 Easily detectable (strong lines with E > 500keV)
2 Barely detectable (no strong lines with E > 500keV, strong lines at E>300keV)
3 Almost undetectable (no strong lines with E > 300keV)
4 Undetectable (no strong lines with E > 50keV)
# Isotope Type Category Comments
1 K-40 NORM 1
2 Co-60 MED/IND 1 Critical activity - 30 GBq.
3 Ga-67 IND 2 May be in category 3 - the only good detectable line has E = 300 keV.
4 Se-75 IND 2 May be in category 3, line 400 keV is not very good, but lines 264 and 279 keV are better.
5 Kr-85m MED 2 May be in category 3 - the only good detectable line has E = 304 keV. 
6 Mo-99 MED 2 Critical activity - 300 GBq.
7 In-111 MED 3
8 Sb-124 IND 1
9 I-131 MED 2 Critical activity - 20 GBq.
10 Xe-133m MED 3 Usually Xe-133 is being used, which in not detectable with our detector.
11 Cs-137 MED/IND 1 Critical activity - 100 GBq.
12 Eu-152 IND 1 Gamma spectra has a lot of lines.
13 Eu-154 IND 1 Gamma spectra has a lot of lines.
14 Yb-169 IND 2 May be in category 3 - the only good detectable line has E = 308 keV.
15 Ir-192 MED/IND 2 Critical activity - 80 GBq.
16 Au-198 MED 2 Critical activity - 60 GBq.
17 Tl-208 NORM 1 Th-232 decay chain.
18 Bi-210m NORM 2 U-238 decay chain, may be in category 3 - good lines are 266 keV and 304 keV.
19 Pb-212 NORM 3 Th-232 decay chain.
20 Bi-214 NORM 1 U-238 decay chain.
21 Pb-214 NORM 2 U-238 decay chain.
22 Ac-228 NORM 1 Th-232 decay chain.
23 Pa-234 NORM 1 U-238 decay chain.
24 U-235 NUC 3
25 U-238 NUC 4
26 Pu-239 NUC 4
27 Pu-240 NUC 4
28 Pu-241 NUC 4
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